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Abstract 
Although social play is common to many species, humans are unique in their ability to extract 
some of the benefits of social play through imagination. For example, in play with imaginary 
companions (ICs), children often practice skills that might be useful for later adaptive social, 
relational, and emotional functioning. While play with ICs does not provide the same immediate 
feedback that play with real others affords, this imagined, quasi-social context allows children to 
experiment with or rehearse events that might occur in real relationships. This symbolic 
enactment of social relationships might afford opportunities to experience not just social 
situations, but all manner of positive and negative emotions in a risk-free way. In addition, 
children’s interactions with real others around their ICs allow for negotiation of social roles in 
real relationships. ICs also provide a forum for psychological distance that might help young 
children manage their real relationships and engage in processes such as negotiation and 
cooperation, which are needed for successful social adaptation. Although play with ICs is clearly 
not of adaptive value in an evolutionary sense, for the children who create them, ICs might hold 
psychological significance for adaptive social development. 
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The Psychological Significance of Play with Imaginary Companions in Early Childhood 
Play, particularly in mammals, is often social. Social play episodes consist of individual, 
specific interactions between two players and are situated in the larger context of the relationship 
between the individuals. But what if one of the play partners does not actually exist? Are the 
psychological and evolutionary advantages of social forms of play relevant when play 
interactions are only imagined? Certainly such play is only found in humans, owing to the 
complex cognition involved in fantasy. But this form of play, specifically, young children’s play 
with imaginary companions, might nevertheless have a significant psychological role in 
development. Moreover, to the extent that play with imaginary companions shares structural or 
functional similarities to social play with real partners, it can be compared to and contrasted with 
the manifestations or functions of social play in other animals. Although such an approach is 
unlikely to lead to the conclusion that imaginary companions are a significant evolutionary 
adaptation, it highlights both the uniqueness of this play to humans and emphasizes the 
importance of social processes, and the play that might facilitate them, common to many species.  
Although previous literature has extensively explored the nature and function of social 
play in myriad species (e.g., Bekoff, 1995; Connolly & Doyle, 1984; Durand & Schank, 2015; 
Pelligrini, 1992; Pellis & Pellis, 2007), the goal of this paper is to demonstrate that, at least for 
humans, social play is not limited to instances in which multiple partners are present. Instead, the 
human capacity for imagination provides a context that might afford many of the benefits of true 
social play. In some ways, an imagined social partner might even be better than a real one since 
its characteristics can be tailored to a child’s needs. Imaginary play partners might also facilitate 
the development of social competence, particularly with respect to the regulation of emotions 
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and the acquisition of interpersonal skills useful in adulthood, such as cooperation and 
perspective-taking. This mapping of skills from play in childhood to adaptation in adulthood is 
one way in which play with imaginary companions is similar to processes found in other species. 
Imaginary companions also provide a context for negotiating real social roles and exploring 
aspects of the social hierarchy, as well as a tool for displacing negative emotions from a real to 
an imaginary relationship. In short, for a species with sufficient cognitive skills, a real play 
partner is not necessary for social play, and the fact that humans engage in play with imaginary 
companions reinforces the centrality of relationships to human development.  
Imaginary Companions 
An imaginary companion (IC) is a character, sometimes invisible and sometimes 
embodied in an object such as a stuffed animal or doll, which is animated by a child and treated 
as real. Up to 65% of children have an IC at some point prior to the age of 7 (Taylor, Carlson, 
Maring, Gerow, & Charley, 2004), and many, albeit fewer, children report ICs later in 
development as well (e.g., Pearson et al., 2001; Taylor, Hulette, & Dishion, 2010). These 
creations come in all shapes, sizes, and forms, from humans to animals, spirits, objects, and 
fantasy creatures (see Table 1 for examples of ICs that I have encountered in my work). They 
also range in imagined age, gender, and appearance. Often transitional objects, such as blankets 
or stuffed animals, evolve over time into so-called personified objects, to which children 
attribute personality, animation, emotion, and preferences (Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup, 2000). 
Similarly, invisible ICs can be based on fictional characters, real people, or entirely made up. 
Indeed, the range and variety of the phenomenon runs contrary to the notion that a prototypical 
IC exists (Taylor & Carlson, 2002). 
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The lack of a prototypical IC is part of what makes their psychological significance an 
intriguing line of inquiry. If ICs fit a single template, an understanding of the psychological 
significance of children’s play with them would have to focus on differences between children 
who did and did not engage in such play. However, research comparing these groups of children 
has found much more similarity than distinction. Children with and without ICs do not differ on 
variables like most personality traits, family structure, number of real friends, or school 
experience (Gleason et al., 2000; Manosevitz, Prentice, & Wilson, 1973; Taylor, 1999), although 
some evidence suggests that children with ICs are more likely than their peers to be firstborn or 
only children (Gleason et al., 2000; Masih, 1978) and to be sociable (Singer & Singer, 1990; 
Taylor, 1999). ICs are also slightly more common in girls than boys (Carlson & Taylor, 2005).  
Because few differences emerge between children with and without ICs, investigations of 
ICs’ psychological function might instead focus on the characteristics of children’s play with 
them. Some features of pretend friends highlight why this form of play could be significant in 
children’s development, particularly in the social domain. Specifically, ICs often have striking 
longevity, lasting for months or even years and showing stability in their descriptions (Partington 
& Grant, 1984; Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). ICs are also often incorporated into 
children’s daily routines, becoming, in some instances, an imaginary member of the family 
(Newson & Newson, 1968; Taylor, 1999). This persistence, combined with their integration into 
children’s daily lives (Gleason et al., 2000) points to their relevance and importance to the 
children who create them. In addition, their status as quasi-relationship partners has led to 
scientific inquiry into the ways in which relationships with ICs are both similar to and different 
from relationships with real partners (Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006). 
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Imaginary Companions as Relationship Partners 
Conceptualizing ICs in psychological terms as quasi-relationship partners might be a 
reasonable approach for understanding the significance of this form of play. A host of empirical 
evidence supports this interpretation as well. For example, the desire for a social partner is often 
cited as the reason why children create ICs (Ames & Learned, 1946; Gleason et al., 2000; 
Manosevitz et al., 1973; Svendsen, 1934). In qualitative work, children and parents often 
describe ICs as distinct others, whose thoughts and behaviors influence their own (Hoff, 2004-
2005; Newson & Newson, 1968), and who are sources of significant emotion (Taylor, 1999). 
Such interdependence of thoughts, behaviors, and emotions, in conjunction with physical 
proximity, longevity, and reciprocity across contexts, is what defines real close interpersonal 
relationships (Kelley et al., 1983), and these features are all imagined in child-IC relationships 
(Taylor, 1999). 
Imaginary relationship variations. Thinking of ICs as providing relationships for 
children—albeit imagined ones—gives a new perspective by which variations in ICs can be 
understood. At first glance, these relationships would be expected to be idealized. After all, why 
would a child imagine a relationship that was anything other than idyllic? While some research 
does suggest that, at least for preschool children, ICs provide forms of social support and 
relationship benefits that are in line with what the children obtain from best real friends 
(Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Hohmann, 2006), ICs are not always stereotyped, “perfect” friends. 
ICs have been known to frighten children, upset them, cause disappointment and conflict, and 
disobey them (Taylor, 1999; Taylor, Carlson, & Shawber, 2007). Some children describe their 
ICs in terms suggesting that the children do not determine their ICs behaviors, even while 
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acknowledging that the IC is not real (Taylor & Mottweiler, 2008). Imaginary enemies have even 
been documented in the literature among typically developing children (Taylor, 1999). These 
individual differences in relationships with ICs support the idea that these imagined entities 
function in some way as relationship partners, providing varied types of interaction and possibly 
even filling specified roles within children’s social networks. 
Conceptualizing ICs as relationship partners has led to empirical work suggesting that the 
functional significance of these creations is partly rooted in children’s efforts to make sense of 
relationships and their different structures. By using Weiss’s (1974) notion of social 
“provisions,” or characteristics afforded by relationships, Gleason (2002) established that young 
children associate relationship characteristics with their ICs just as they do with real 
relationships. Moreover, ICs are related to patterns of provisions in systematic ways. Typically, 
relationships with ICs are described in terms that make them recognizable as either hierarchical 
or egalitarian in their organization (Gleason, 2002; Gleason & Kalpidou, 2014). So whereas ICs 
themselves seem to exist in every shape, size, and form, limited only by children’s imagination, 
children’s relationships with ICs tend to follow systematic, predictable patterns.  
Characteristics of relationships with ICs. Relationship characteristics associated with 
ICs also appear to relate to their form. Personified objects, for instance, often afford hierarchical 
relationships, in which the child plays the role of the parent or more competent partner. These 
objects, whether dolls, stuffed animals, or other objects, thus typically receive extensive 
nurturance and guidance from children. In contrast, invisible imaginary companions more 
commonly provide egalitarian relationships akin to friendships (Gleason, 2002; Gleason et al., 
2000). Children often describe invisible companions as playmates with whom they share 
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decision-making regarding activities and plans. The reasons for these associations between 
relationship type and IC form are unclear, as is the direction of influence. That is, whether 
children begin with a particular form of IC (i.e., personified object or invisible) and develop a 
relationship accordingly, or whether the type of relationship desired by the child prompts 
gravitation toward a particular form, is unknown.  
The distinct patterns found among young children’s imagined relationships might be 
psychologically meaningful, given that theoretically, relationships with ICs could have any 
combination of characteristics. Because they are entirely imagined, the features of child-IC 
relationships could easily be contradictory or inconsistent, or even constantly changing. Why, 
then, do children create relationships that conform to the patterns of characteristics found in real 
relationships? Why does one child create an imaginary baby while another creates an imaginary 
best friend? The fact that these invented relationships are systematic in their organization 
suggests the hypothesis that the relationship created with an IC might have significance or 
purpose specific to the child that invents it (Gleason & White, 2005). Children might thus be 
choosing the relationship form and type that they seek for their own psychological purposes, 
tailoring their ICs to provide particular social contexts or social affordances.  
ICs as social experience. The hypothesis that children might construct individualized, 
imagined social contexts through play with ICs is consistent with Henricks (2015) construction 
of play as experience. In this view, play is actively sought as a pathway to self-realization, in 
which various actions are considered and implemented, and then evaluated in terms of their 
usefulness or appeal to the individual. Similarly, through play, all manner of emotion—even 
negative emotion—can be sought and experienced in a designated context that is more easily 
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regulated than in real life. Vygotsky’s (1967) notion of pretend play as providing the zone of 
proximal development provides the theoretical mechanism by which self-realization is achieved. 
Within this framework, play with ICs could be conceptualized as a forum for exploring the 
nature and function of social relationships and their associated emotions, again within the safe 
confines of the play context. In the imagined relationship with the IC, children experiment and, 
in a sense, experience, interactions from which they are able to learn and possibly internalize the 
rules of social relationships. In other words, ICs provide a simulation of a relationship 
environment, constructed by the child, in which particular interpersonal skills and experiences 
can be encountered and learned. 
This perspective of ICs as a social context invented for exploration of relationship skills 
and contexts helps explain why some children create ICs who are idealized, and some have ICs 
whose behavior is difficult at best. Invention of an idealized IC certainly occurs and allows 
children to enjoy relationship benefits like companionship and validation. For example, a 4-year-
old participant in one study created an invisible version of his best friend from school, Danny. 
The boy’s mother described the phenomenon as a function of her child’s status as an only child, 
his affection for the real Danny, and his desire to play with Danny not just at school but as much 
as possible. She also pointed out, however, that whereas her son and the real Danny had to 
navigate occasional conflicts in their play, invisible Danny was quick to acquiesce to her son’s 
desires (Gleason et al, 2000). In this case, the IC behaved in ways consistent with what we might 
expect from invented relationships, including unconditional acceptance and limitless flexibility. 
While the goal of this imaginary social context appeared to be largely affordance of 
companionship for an only child, the lack of social effort involved in maintaining the 
PLAY WITH IMAGINARY COMPANIONS 10 
relationship might have been a welcome relief from the work necessary to manage his 
relationship with his real best friend.  
Other children might explore negative aspects of relationships through ICs. Take, for 
instance, Charlie Ravioli. In an essay in the the New Yorker, Adam Gopnik (2002) wrote about 
his 3-year-old daughter Olivia’s invisible imaginary companion, Charlie Ravioli. Charlie’s 
defining characteristic was his unavailability. Try as she might, Olivia was rarely if ever able to 
meet up with Charlie, and their missed phone calls and brief interactions on the street were a 
source of frustration to her. Gopnik explained Olivia’s relationship with Charlie in terms of how 
it reflected the hectic lives of her parents. By creating this dissatisfying relationship, Olivia 
invented a social context in which to try to understand the circumstances and feelings that 
accompany a busy schedule in which lengthy social interactions are difficult to achieve—a 
schedule much like that of her parents.  
What this research and these examples suggest is that imagination provides an important 
venue for young children to consider and explore the nature of social relationships. The 
psychological significance of this kind of play is highlighted in the choices children make in 
engagement in these simulated relationships. Children who create ICs, in creating imaginary 
social relationships, invent social contexts that afford consideration of all manner of 
interpersonal issues and their associated emotions. By symbolically representing relationships 
through their ICs, children’s preoccupations with particular features of real relationships might 
be evident at a point in childhood when they are not typically well-articulated (Fraiberg, 1959). 
Each child might use the IC as a way of mastering a concept or skill that is difficult to manage in 
reality, but possible to achieve through the abstraction of play (Vygotsky, 1967). Consequently, a 
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child attempting to understand the irreversibility of death might have an IC that dies, and a child 
trying to understand power dynamics might create an IC that frequently misbehaves and needs 
significant guidance.  
Imaginary Companions as a Context for Social Skill Development  
Although ICs have not been studied extensively as a social context, some evidence 
suggests that they might prove useful to children for honing social skills in two ways. First, 
relationships with ICs—particularly friendships—are a risk-free way of practicing emotion 
regulation, and second, much like other forms of play, play with ICs might provide a venue for 
practice of a large set of interpersonal social skills that foster successful social adaptation in 
adulthood. 
ICs, friendship, and emotion regulation. Because an imaginary other affords 
opportunities for all manner of interpersonal experiences, such as nurturance, affiliation, 
cooperation, empathy, negotiation, and conflict, the child-IC relationship might be a tool for 
addressing not just the details of interpersonal interaction, but for larger tasks of social 
development (Gleason, 2013). One such task in early childhood is the creation and management 
of friendship. Unlike relationships encountered earlier in development, primarily within the 
family, friendship is both egalitarian and open in construction, meaning that neither member of 
the relationship is inherently more powerful or competent than the other, and either can terminate 
the relationship at any time (Hartup, 1983). ICs offer a useful opportunity to practice friendship 
skills in a risk-free way. Anecdotes in the literature detail instances in which children and ICs are 
inseparable playmates, as well as instances in which an IC rejected the child’s friendship outright 
(Newson & Newson, 1968; Taylor, 1999). Perhaps ICs provide the negative social experiences 
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some children seek to explore without the risks or anxieties inherent in the maintenance of real 
relationships—especially those like friendship, that are subject to dissolution. What is more, 
when children’s exploration of the social ideas addressed by the ICs are satisfied, these 
imaginary relationships are easily ended (Kastenbaum & Fox, 2007-2008). 
In cases in which ICs are rejecting, the necessity of coping with such emotional 
difficulties is a clear theme. Interestingly, differences have been noted between the emotional 
coping strategies of children with egalitarian ICs and those with hierarchical ones. Children 
whose ICs provided friendship endorsed coping strategies that were more mature and 
sophisticated than those of their counterparts whose ICs were subordinate to them (Gleason & 
Kalpidou, 2014). These correlational findings do not, of course, suggest that creation of an 
imaginary friendship results in better emotional coping strategies, but they do suggest a positive 
relation between simulation of a friendship and these social skills.  
Research comparing children with and without ICs also suggests that pretend friends 
might be implicated in children’s efforts to regulate emotions. In comparison to their peers, 
children with ICs might have a particular focus on social relationships that is tinged with anxiety, 
at least among school-aged children. For example, children with ICs experience more 
concentration anxiety than do their peers, meaning that they have greater concerns regarding 
their ability to meet others’ expectations (albeit within a nonclinical range). These concerns are 
postulated to mean that children with ICs might be particularly attuned to social interactions with 
others (Bouldin & Pratt, 2002). This notion is consistent with the greater social anxiety 
experienced by children with versus without ICs in middle childhood (Shavel-Jessop & Segal, 
2005) and the greater frequency of undergraduate women with dependent interpersonal styles 
PLAY WITH IMAGINARY COMPANIONS 13 
than other styles to remember ICs from childhood (Gleason, Jarudi, & Cheek, 2003). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that play with ICs might provide a useful forum for simulating 
social experiences for individuals who are high on sociability and potentially also preoccupied 
with their interpersonal relationships—a hypothesis that might underlie individual differences in 
engagement in this sort of play, particularly after the preschool period. 
ICs and social competence. In addition to the opportunities that ICs afford children for 
regulating emotion, play with ICs might provide a context for exercise or exploration of other 
specific behaviors or social skills useful in adulthood. This idea dovetails with much of the 
research examining connections between play in early life and adaptation in adulthood, and is 
one area in which this form of play can be examined in relation to that of other species. Certainly 
studies of human children have established correlations between, for example, engagement in 
pretend play and enhanced social skills (Connolly & Doyle, 1984; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; 
although see review by Lillard [2013] regarding the lack of evidence for a causal relationship), 
and engagement in rough-and-tumble play and social problem-solving (Pelligrini, 1992). 
Similarly, work in other animals supports the notion of a relationship between playful behaviors 
in development and cooperation in adulthood (Bekoff, 2001), in part because of the social 
deficits that emerge when play is thwarted early in development (e.g., Pellis & Pellis, 2007). This 
perspective raises the question of whether any skills practiced in interactions with ICs might be 
used later in development. 
In most social forms of play across species, the skills required for the play to start and 
continue, such as cooperation and reciprocity, are thought to be important in adult social 
functioning (Durand & Schank, 2015). In play, individuals must regulate their own behaviors 
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and emotional responses. For instance, overly aggressive attacks in rough and tumble play, or 
unmanageably frightening themes introduced into pretend play, are likely to result in play 
termination. Over time, young players learn these rules and develop a repertoire of behaviors that 
constitute the basis of coordinated, social play. Göncü (in press) describes these skills in terms of 
social imaginative play as intersubjective, that is, a shared endeavor—cognitively, emotionally, 
motivationally, and communicatively. This self-regulation of behavior in coordination with the 
needs and desires of others is one of the bases for successful social interactions in adulthood.  
Play with ICs affords a wider array of social situations and experiences than typical play. 
For example, play fighting with a real partner requires a delicate balance of aggression and 
retreat, reciprocity of dominance, and reminders that the fighting is playful (Bekoff, 2001). In 
contrast, a child can imagine a conflict with an IC, engage in all manner of behaviors and 
manifestations of anger for as long as desired, and then either choose to engage in the complex 
process of conflict resolution or simply declare the conflict ended (without the negative 
relational implications that would be likely should a child choose this route with a real peer). A 
child who chooses the latter course of action might miss out on the benefits of learning and 
practicing conflict resolution skills, but the purpose of such play might relate to the experience 
and management of overwhelming negative emotions rather than social reconciliation per se. In 
this way, children’s interactions with their ICs allow them to practice precisely the social skills 
they want to practice, and to avoid those they do not. 
Although simulating a relationship with another being provides a context for practicing 
social skills that might be useful in adulthood, the fact that the play partner is not real in child-IC 
play has implications for what might or might not be learned in this play. Specifically, juveniles 
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of many species engaging in play learn the repertoire of behaviors needed to engage in and 
sustain social forms of play. Such behaviors include signals that acknowledge the context as 
play, such as bowing in canids (Bekoff, 1995) and frequent role reversals (attacker versus 
defender) in rats (Pellis & Pellis, 2007). Learning to provide and interpret such signals is part of 
the mutual coordination of behavior that theoretically provides practice for cooperation and 
reciprocity in relationships later in development (Durand & Schank, 2015; Pellis & Pellis, 2007).  
Young human children engage in these signals of play just as dogs and rats do. Social 
pretense, for example, is marked for and by children through signals like smiles and looks and 
specific kinds of statements that define and describe the play (Farver, 1992; Lillard & 
Witherington, 2004). In the case of ICs, however, children are engaging in a form of pretense 
that does not have to be signaled, as the play partner, as it were, does not exist. Instead, pretense 
involving an IC is a simulation of reality—including performance of behaviors that imitate real 
interactions without the necessity of signaling that it is play. In an odd way, then, this form of 
play lies somewhere between the practice in coordination of behaviors necessitated by other 
forms of play, and the practice in interpersonal skills available in interactions with real others. 
Instead of learning to signal, “This is play,” children playing with ICs simulate actual interaction. 
Simulation of interaction in the form of an IC turns out to be correlated with quite a few 
interpersonal skills. For example, in comparison to their peers, children with ICs have been 
found to be more sociable (Partington & Grant, 1984), more cooperative (Singer & Singer, 
1990), and better at talking to and initiating activities with adults (Manosevitz et al., 1973). Some 
research finds advanced theory of mind among young children with ICs in comparison to their 
peers (Taylor & Carlson, 1997), as well as a richness in the narratives they tell to others (Trionfi 
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& Reese, 2009) and in their understanding of what information another person needs in hearing a 
story (Roby & Kidd, 2008).  Again, teasing apart the causal relationships between these skills 
and the simulation of a social relationship has not been accomplished, and the significant number 
of children who do not create ICs and yet develop sophisticated social skills suggests that this 
phenomenon is but one pathway to successful, adaptive social functioning in adulthood. 
The lack of signaling needed in play with ICs is not the only way in which it diverges 
from other forms of play. Contrary to many forms of play in several species, children frequently 
share their play with ICs with adults (i.e., parents) but not with other children (Gleason et al., 
2000). Certainly human adults and adults in other species (particularly primates) engage in play 
with juveniles (Pellis & Iwaniuk, 1999), but the fact that children rarely share their ICs with 
children outside of their own families is unusual for play in humans. It raises the question of 
whether ICs are particular somehow to the social contexts in which they exist; that is, ICs might 
be useful or relevant in ways that relate more to the parent-child or family relationships than to 
the peer context. The psychological significance of play with ICs might thus be considered in 
terms of its effects on the real social context, particularly with reference to the child-parent 
relationship.  
Imaginary Companions in the Real Social Context 
The role of IC play in child-parent relationships is relevant given that children often 
discuss their ICs with parents (Newson & Newson, 1968; Taylor, 1999). Not all children with 
ICs do so, of course (Taylor & Carlson, 1997), but for those that do, these conversations might 
be particularly important. For one thing, parents who do know about their children’s ICs report 
more talk about the ICs than with the ICs, particularly for children with invisible imaginary 
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companions (Gleason & White, 2005). In a sense, then, children’s IC play occurs at least partly 
in the context of the parent-child relationship, and might theoretically influence that relationship 
in significant ways. Specifically, children’s IC play with parents affords opportunities to 
negotiate social roles, particularly within the family hierarchy, as well as providing opportunity 
for psychological distance in handling emotionally charged situations. 
 Negotiation of social roles. A great deal of play is executed with attention to social roles 
and norms (Pellis & Pellis, 2007). In the case of children and adults, especially parents, the 
relationship is well defined by its vertical nature, in that adults are more competent, skilled, and 
powerful than children, but also bear responsibility for the children’s well-being. In cases in 
which both adults and children participate in play related to ICs, both parties must acknowledge 
the boundaries to their own roles in the play. To do so results in an interesting dynamic, because 
children are the authorities on their ICs’ thoughts and actions (Klein, 1985). In contrast to most 
every other situation in the parent-child relationship, children are the experts regarding ICs, and 
the fact that the IC is entirely the child’s creation must be respected. However, even in the 
context of play with or around a child’s IC, the authority of the adult must be preserved. For 
example, if a child reports that the IC wants to misbehave, the parent is unlikely to acquiesce.  
According to examples in the literature, failure either to acknowledge the child’s expertise on the 
IC or to maintain parental authority has negative consequences for the play. 
    Benson and Pryor (1973) describe an incident in which a well-meaning grandfather 
asked his granddaughter to have her invisible IC dog close his garage door. When she agreed, 
unbeknownst to her, the grandfather activated the automated door, surprising the girl. After this 
incident, the girl stopped talking about her imaginary dog. When questioned as to its 
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whereabouts, she replied that she no longer played with the dog because it had to remain at her 
grandfather’s house so as to operate the garage door. In a similar episode in a qualitative study, 
an adult’s effort to make a child’s personified object teddy bear dance resulted in the child 
grabbing the bear away from the adult, tossing it aside, and pushing the adult out the door. The 
child subsequently apologized to the bear, but not to the adult (Gleason & White, 2005). In both 
of these instances, the adult’s co-opting of the IC’s actions changed the dynamics of the play. For 
the dog, IC play was ended; for the teddy bear, the child-IC relationship was preserved, but 
significant anger was expressed at the adult and play was temporarily suspended. 
Children often discuss their ICs in a way that attributes autonomy of thought and action 
to these creations (Taylor et al., 2007). In these instances, parents are rarely able to convince the 
child to simply imagine that the IC is behaving differently. For instance, Taylor (1999) reports 
one family’s outing to a horse show. The mother specifically brought her 3-year-old daughter, 
who had an imaginary pony, because of her interest in horses. However, the outing was ruined 
by the fact that child searched for her invisible pony to no avail—he wasn’t there, and the girl 
was genuinely frustrated. The girl’s mother could not convince her to pretend otherwise. 
While children are the experts on their ICs, adults typically limit the use of the IC to 
subvert the hierarchy between children and parents in other contexts. For example, many 
children with ICs have tried placing blame for their own misbehavior onto their ICs at least once 
(Fraiberg, 1959; Gleason et al., 2000; Newson & Newson, 1968; Taylor, 1999) Anecdotally, 
parents report children using ICs to delay bedtime or avoid other unpleasant activities, but these 
efforts are not usually successful. For instance, a child in one study told his father that the IC had 
made a rule that people wearing belts could not come in the child’s room, meaning that the father 
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would be unable to put the child to bed. The father’s response was simply, “OK, let’s go to bed” 
(Gleason & White, 2005). By refusing to engage in conversation about the IC and its new rule, 
the father did not engage in the play and instead, asserted his authority. 
Of course, children also engage their parents in play with the IC that is consistent with 
the hierarchical organization of the parent-child relationship. For example, parents are often 
asked to do things for the companion, such as buckle it in the car or set a place for it at the table 
(Benson & Pryor, 1973; Stone & Church, 1968). The extent to which parents are willing to 
indulge these requests can be interpreted as individual differences in the extent to which parents 
are willing to engage in this symbolic form of play as per their children’s requests.  
ICs as a tool for psychological distance. Play with ICs is a means of interpersonal 
communication, and children sometimes recognize the usefulness of the IC for communicating 
negative feelings (e.g., anger at the parent) indirectly. This displacement of negative emotion 
onto the IC is a form of psychological distancing—cognitively separating from the reality of the 
situation and representing it symbolically instead (Sigel, 1993). Theoretically, by attributing their 
own emotions to their ICs, children provide themselves with a way of detaching from an 
emotionally charged situation so as to examine it from a third party perspective. Play with ICs, 
like pretend play, thus provides opportunities to self-regulate through abstraction into symbolism 
(Vygotsky, 1967). Such psychological distancing makes this play valuable as a tool for 
displacing overwhelming emotion—thus helping to preserve positive feelings within the reality 
of the parent-child relationship and maintain communication.  
The ability to use imagination to obtain psychological distance in this manner has been 
positively related to children’s ability to process emotionally-charged information (Carlson & 
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Davis, 2005). It has also been positively related to children’s executive function (White & 
Carlson, 2016), a skill set including self-control and mental flexibility that has implications for 
successful functioning in relationships. The opportunity that ICs provide for creating 
psychological distance from the puzzles and emotions inherent in close relationships might allow 
for successful resolution of complex social issues. Such practice is particularly important for 
young children who are not yet capable of simultaneously engaging in complex relationship 
negotiations and regulating strong emotions. An interesting hypothesis is that the development of 
these skills and the ability to integrate them might be a factor accounting for the lower incidence 
of ICs as children age. If provision of psychological distance is a major function of play with 
ICs, then ICs might wane in their usefulness as social skills and self-regulation develop. 
Conclusions 
Consideration of the evolutionary and psychological significance of play with ICs makes 
clear that such behavior is not an evolutionary adaptation in and of itself. The mere fact that only 
some children create such friends, and yet most typically-developing children master the social 
skills necessary for healthy relationships, suggests that ICs are not a determinant of evolutionary 
fitness. Instead, this form of play is likely a by-product of two other adaptations that have 
conferred a significant advantage over the course of evolution. First, the evolution of imagination 
opened human cognition to all kinds of advantages in planning for the future and consideration 
of possible outcomes to various courses of action. Second, like other social mammals, humans 
have evolved neurobiological systems that promote the formation of social bonds. These 
attachments are shaped by processes in the earliest parent-child relationships, generalizing to 
later close relationships as well as basic affiliation with conspecifics—all bonds associated with 
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health and well-being (Bowlby, 1979; Feldman, 2017). The combined capacities for imagination 
and relationship-formation might be behind the development of ICs in play. Indeed, we might be 
surprised if, in play, human children did not occasionally exercise a valuable, complex cognitive 
skill like imagination in relation to their most pressing psychological concern, relationships with 
others. 
 Children’s interactions with ICs and their interactions with others in relation to ICs 
suggest a psychological purpose to this play that is primarily social and largely symbolic. ICs are 
thus simultaneously unique to humans in their use of complex cognitive skills like imagination 
and fantasy, but consistent with play in other social animals in their emphasis on the centrality of 
interactions and relationships to the developmental process. The fact that children’s relationships 
with their ICs reflect the social organization inherent in relationships with real others highlights 
the usefulness of this sort of play in the study of development and children’s emerging 
understanding of social hierarchies and networks. At the same time, ICs emphasize the 
psychological significance of play in helping children learn to negotiate and manage social 
interactions and use symbolism as a tool for understanding their own and others’ emotions and 
behavior. This extra practice, albeit imagined and only a simulation of reality, might help 
children develop the social skills and relationship-related cognitive abilities necessary for 
successful adaptation in adulthood.   
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Table 1 
Examples of Imaginary Companions 
Name Description 
Invisible imaginary companions 
Super Muscles An imagined superhero that has large muscles and the power to shrink. 
Ari An invisible boy that has his own house, school, family and birthday. 
Sunny, Ruby, & Rosie Fairies with different colored hair that fly around the child’s room. 
Ale An invisible boy who lives on Saturn and has younger twin sisters. 
Julia An invisible teenager that has a pet cat and long rainbow colored hair. 
Personified objects 
Ariel & Kennedy Two dolls who do everything that the child does. 
Lamby A blanket with a lamb head who is responsible for any mischief. 
Asparagus & Flatomire Stuffed turtles, who are the child’s babies. 
Chocolate A stuffed moose, who speaks in a special voice and dislikes peanut 
butter. 
Leppy A stuffed leopard, who is only friends with other cats and speaks 
Leppy language. 
 
